Introduction
This chapter describes the mechanisms of Swiss criminallaw that encourage companies to develop compliance programs in order to prevent corruption. Although the application of individual criminalliability and sanctions is potentially harmful to a company's reputation, and therefore also calls for preventive action, it was the introduction of corporate crirninal liability that established a direct link between criminal sanctions and the obligation to introduce preventive measures in the form of anticonuption compliance programs.
Before addressing the role of compliance programs in Swiss crirninal law, this chapter brie fly describes the provisions defming the offenses of active and passive bribery and the impact of corruption in Switzerland.
Swiss Anticorruption Law in a Nutshell
Bribery of Swiss officials has been a federal offense since the enactment of the Swiss Crirninal Code of 1937 (SCC), 1 and was punishable even before that, under the cantonal penallaws. The provisions of the SCC goveming corruption have been amended twice, in 1999 and 2005.
The frrst revision was undertaken in order to allow Switzerland to ratify the Organisation for Economie Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Intemational Business Transactions (1997) . Accordingly, its main feature was the creation of a crirninal offense prohibiting active bribery of public officials offoreign states and international organizations (Alticle 322septies SCC). The provisions involving national public officials were also amended, with the general aim of punishing active bribery, considered a lesser offense in the SCC of 1937, as harshly as passive bribery (Articles 322 1 e'to 322scxics SCC).
The 2005 revision was launched in order to comply with the obligations set out in the Council of Europe Crirninal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999; among other amendments, passive bribery of foreign public officials was also made a crime (Article 322septies (2) SCC).
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption of 2003 (Merida Convention) did not necessitate any revision of the Swiss legislation, since the catalog of offenses is the same as in the Council of Europe Convention. Fmthermore, the idea of restituting assets to the victirn states, which contributed to making the Merida Convention a success among third world countries, was already well established in Swiss law and practice.
2 So far, Switzerland has returned more assets stolen by 1 An English translation of the SCC is provided by the Swiss Federal Administration. However, it is not an official version of the legal text, and he nee has no legal force. Swiss public servants do not have a reputation for being particularly prone to soliciting or accepting bribes. In fact, Switzerland always ranks among the countries with very good scores in the Corruption Perception Index issued annually by Transparency International; in 2012, it was ranked sixth out of a total of 174 countries on a scale from the cleanest to the most corrupt. 7 The reputation of Swiss companies doing business in foreign markets is also excellent, as evidenced by the frrst rank occupied in the 2011 Bribe Payers Index established by Transparency International, reflecting the perceived likelihood of comparues from 28 leading economies to win business abroad by paying bribes.s
The rank.ing established by Transparency International only reflects perceptions and therefore does not allow any definitive conclusions to be drawn about the number of acts of conuption effectively committed. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that corruption is not endemie in Switzerland and that paying bribes to public officiais is not considered a normal or ethically acceptable way of doing business and obtaining contracts. This does not mean that Swiss corporations are totally exempt from corrupt practices. In fact, a study pub li shed in 20 12 shows that 40.3% of Swiss companies active abroad are confronted with demands for " informai payments" from public and private agents. More importantly, 56% of the comparues which have received solicitations of this nature declare that they have indeed made such payments, representing about 5% oftheir turnover (Becker et al. 2012, p. 17) .
As for the number of criminal convictions on corruption charges, it is, predictably, not very high, that is, between 6 and 16 convictions per year (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) involving the conuption of Swiss public officiais. 9 The total number of convictions on charges of conuption of foreign officiais, since it became an offense in May 2000, is three so far, according to the data made available by the Federal Office of Statistics. There are no statistics showing the number of convictions for the bribery of private agents, but it is generally held that no such convictions have been handed down until now. 10 a complaint by the injured party would be dropped; see "Rapport explicatif concernant la modification du code pénal et du code pénal militaire (Dispositions pénales incriminant la corruption)," http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/kriminalitaetlgesetzgebung/korruptionsstrafrecht/ vorentw-f.pdf, accessed 15 May 2013.
The Role of Compliance Programs in Criminal
Liability of Natural Persons 495 Until2003, Swiss criminallaw applied the princip le societas delinquere non po test, with the exception of sorne minor cases of administrative penal law. Companies could therefore not be criminally charged and convicted in Switzerland. This does not mean that issues of corporate responsibility and governance were entirely absent from the criminal courts during the twentieth century. ln fact, sorne very high-profile cases refened to those issues in recognizing the criminalliability of the head of a company ("responsabilité du chef de l'entreprise," "Geschaftsherrenhaftung" ). A first case decided by the Federal Tribunal (Swiss Supreme Court) in 1970 involved the head of a weapons company (Mr. Bührle ), who was found guilty of intentionally breaching the Federal War Material Act, because he failed to effectively prevent arms sales and exports to certain foreign countries by his employees in violation of an embargo decreed by the government.
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The second and most important decision was handed down in 1996 in the case of Von Roll, a group of companies manufacturing large steel parts such as pipes and presses.
12 The company sold products to Iraq that were purportedly destined for industrial pm·poses, whereas they were in fact bought as part of the project known as Saddam Hussein's Supergun. Von Roll had never been active in the arms trade, and the construction of the Supergun never succeeded and was ultimately abandoned. The chairman of the board of Von Roll, who was also the chief legal of:ficer of the company, was neve11heless convicted for having negligently permitted an illegal arrns deal, in spi te of the fact that he had neither known about the sale of the steel parts to Iraq nor suspected that the parts could be used to build a gun. He was convicted, alongside the persons directly involved in the deal, for not having put control mechanisms in place which would have allowed him to detect the fact that there were suspicions about the legality of this contract.
Although he was the only member of the board held liable, the framing of the Federal Tribunal ruling makes it clear that ultimate responsibility for ensm-ing that preventive measm-es are effectively implemented is exercised collectively b.y the members of the board, who are under a duty to prevent risks which are typically linked to the business of the company. This includes the duty to ensm-e that any important event is brought to the attention of the board of directors and that any red flags are recognized as such and promptly reported to it.
The criminal liability of the head of a company is founded on individual culpability, that is, the fact that he or she omits measw-es which would have prevented his or her subordinates from committing the offense. Bence, the mens rea is defmed by the particular offense. In the case of Von Roll, the offense under the Swiss War Material Act prohibited both intention and negligence. Therefore, the prosecution only had to show that the chairman of the board charged with the offense had been LL ATF 96 TV 155. 12 ATF 122 lV 103. negligent in not taking the necessary preventive measures. Whenever intention is required, as is the case for all bribery offenses, the prosecution must show that the head of the company acted at !east with dolus eventualis. 13 undertaking, then the felony or misdemeanor shall be attributed to the undertaking. ln such cases, the undertaking shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 5 million francs. 2. If the offense committed falls under Articles 260ter, 260quinquies, 305bis, 322ter, 322quinquies or 322septies paragraph 1 oris an offense under Article 4a paragraph 1 letter a of the Federal Act of 19 Dec 1986 on Unfair Competition, the undertaking shaH be penalized irrespec~ tive of the criminalliability of any natural persans, provided the undertaking is respon~ si ble for failing to take ali the reasonable organizational measures that were required in arder to prevent such an offense. 3. The court shall assess the fine in particular in accordance with the seriousness of the offense, the seriousness of the organizational inadequacies and of the Joss or damage caused, and based on the economie ability of the undertaking to pay the fine. 4. Undertakings within the rneaning of this title are: a. any legal entity under private law; b. any legal entity under public law with exception of local authorities; c. companies; d. sole proprietorships.
Article 102 SCC provides for two different regimes of liability. The first paragraph of the atticle describes what is referred to as the subsidiary mode/, and the second paragraph describes the direct mode/. The fust holds the company liable for any felony or misdemeanor committed in the course ofits business activities if the indi~ vi dual perpetrator cannat be identified; the second sets out a limited list of specifie crimes for which the company may be held liable even if an individual perpetrator has been identified and prosecuted.
Features Common to Both Regimes
The two regimes have in common a broad defmition of the entity held liable, which is not referred to as a corporation but an undertaking e"Untemehmen," "entreprise," "impresa"), which is an economie rather than a legal notion. Article 102 (4) SCC mentions not only legal entities but also simple partnerships or sole proprietorships. Undertakings governed by foreign law may also fall within the scope of Article 102 SCC, as long as they are organized in one of the forms described. One of the most important questions discussed among scholars is whether a group of companies may be considered as a single economie unity seen as an "undertaking" or whether the separate legal personhood of the companies prevents the mother company from being held liable for offenses cornmitted anywhere within the group. 16 Another common feature lies in the fact thal the undertaking is held liable for offenses committed by natural persons acting in the scope of its business as defined in the Commercial Registry. Therefore, (1) an act presenting the objective and subjective characteristics of a crime or misdemeanor must have been committed; (2) this offense must be counected to the business of the undertaking in accordance with its abjects; and (3) the person who has committed it must be integrated in the company's hierarchy, The perpetrator may be a member of the board, a director or officer, or even a simple employee. Exte1nal agents such as independent attorneys, as opposed to in-house counsels, are not deemed as acting within the company.
The penalty is a fine not exceeding 5 million Swiss francs. Furthermore, illicit profits are subject to confiscation ( criminal forfeiture) in accordance with Article 70 seq. SCC. Switzerland has a well-established system of criminal forfeiture of assets deriving directly or indirectly fi·om any type of offense (Article 70 SCC), Bribes are undisputedly proceeds from the offense ofbribery and must therefore be confiscated. The Swiss Federal Tribunal has recently held thal illegal profits which the briber draws from the bribery, for example, the profits made from the underlying contract obtained through bribery, are also proceeds subject to confiscation. 17 This is a major step forward, as the offense of money laundering applies to proceeds of crime and is subject to confiscation. Therefore, fmancial intermediaries must file suspicious activities reports if they suspect thal a company has gained money from business obtained through bribery (Article 9 Money Laundering Act).
When the proceeds are no longer available, other assets may be used to cover a clairn for compensation attributed to the state (Article 71 SCC). More importantly, Article 72 SCC allows for the general confiscation of all assets which are subject to the power of disposa! of a criminal organization. ln the case of a person who participates in or supports a crirninal organization (Article 260 1 " SCC), it is presumed that the assets are subject to the power of disposa! of the organization until the contrary is proven. This reversa! ofthe burden of proof may also apply to the assets held by a company if it is controlled by persans having participated in or supported a criminal organization or if the company itselfis held criminally liable on this basis. This also triggers the obligation to file a suspicious activities report.
Distinctive Elements of the Two Models of Criminal Liability of the Undertaking

Subsidiary Liability (Article 102 (1) SCC)
The subsidiary mode! applies to all crimes and misdemeanors not listed in Article 102 (2) SCC. Although it is the general regime governing most offenses, this mode! leaves much to be desired as a basis for criminal liability. The undertaking may be charged, prosecuted, and convicted only if the individual who actually committed the offense caunot be identified due to organizational inadequacies within the company ("it is not possible to attribute [the offense] to any specifie natural person due to the inadequate organization of the company"). In other words, the liability of the undertaking is not triggered by circumstances which caused or permitted the commission of the offense but rather by circumstances "ATF 137 IV 79.
which allowed the perpetrator not to be identified. Consequently, if the undertaking is able to point a fmger at an individual perpetrator, only thal person is prosecuted, thereby exempting the company from any criminalliability. The subsidiary mode\ therefore literally invites manipulations of justice by sacrificing a persan designated to assume criminalliability in order to protee! the company.
The unsatisfactory nature of this regime has been pointed out by many scholars. Unsurprisingly, the business community, which is very influential with the Swiss legislative body, does not share this critique.
Direct Liability (Article 102 (2) SCC)
Fortunately, active bribery is not govemed by the subsidiary mode!, but by the direct liability mode! described in Article 102 (2) SCC.
This mode! allows for a corporate liability wbich is direct, in the sense that it applies to the company on the basis of its organizational inadequacy, regardless of whether the individual who actually committed the crime is prosecuted. It is deemed parallel in the sense that the individual perpetrator and the undertaking may both be brought to trial on the basis of the same set of facts.
This mode! applies on! y to a restricted number of crimes listed in Article 102 (2) SCC: organized crime (Article 260'" SCC); fmancing terrorism (Article 260'"''"'" SCC); money laundering (Article 305bi' SCC); active bribery of public officiais, whether they are Swiss, foreign, or international (Article 322ter, 322quinquîes, and 322"'"" (!) SCC); and active bribery in the private sector (Article 4a (!)(a) Unfair Competition Act).
The company is held criminally liable "for failing to lake ail the reasonable organizational measures that were required in order to prevent such an offense." This inadequacy replaces the notion of "fault" which is key to individual criminal liability. Although the Jack of preventive measures seems to refer to negligence, the criminalliability of undertakings may be based on this approach even if the offense committed requires crhninal intent.
It is for the prosecution to prove the Jack of reasonable and effective preventive measures; there is no reversai of the burden of proof, and the fact thal an offense was committed within the company does not trigger the presumption thal the organizational measures put into place were insufficient. The prosecution must prove thal the company failed to implement adequate preventive measures as weil as the causal nexus between this inadequacy and the fact that the offense was committed.
Th us, compliance programs are at the core of the criminalliability of undertakings: if a company has taken the required organizational measures to prevent individuals from committing offenses such as corruption, it cannot be held criminally liable. Consequently, companies are encouraged to take preventive measures commanded by the specifications of their business, the size of the company, the nature of the commercial activity developed by it, the risks linked to the type of products or services sold, the markets targeted, cross-border risks, and so on.
Defining and implementing the necessary preventive measmes is the responsibility of each company; the govemment has issued no legal guidance and the courts have yet to explore the matter. However, the recent case involving Alstom gives sorne indication as to the general principles defining the requirements of anticorruption compliance programs.
The Alstom Case
Facts
Alstom is a large French multinational conglomerate headquartered near Paris, involved in the power generation and transport markets. Many of its clients are states or state-controlled companies. The group appoints consultants to secure contracts on a success fee basis.
Alstom's Swiss subsidiary, Alstom Network Switzerland AG, was in charge of compliance procedures within the group, in collaboration with the mother company Alstom S.A. It handled the contractual relations with the consultants on behalf of other subsidiaries of the Alstom group of companies. In spite of efforts to regulate and oversee the consultancy agreements, sorne consultants "had forwarded a considerable pa11 of their success fees to foreign decision makers and thereby bad influenced the latter in favor of Alstom."l'
In 2008, the Swiss Attorney General's Office indicted certain natural persans and bothAlstom S.A. andAlstom Network SwitzerlandAG. InNovember 2011, the attorney general issued a "summary penalty arder" (Article 352 Swiss Code ofCriminal Procedure (SCCP); "Strafbefehl," "ordonnance pénale," "decreta d'accusa") against Alstom Network Switzerland AG, which the convicted company did not contest before a court as it could have chosen to do. 19 This conviction accepted by the company appears to have been preceded by negotiations between the prosecution and the Alstom group. Alstom Network Switzerland AG was convicted for failing to take all necessary and reasonable organizational precautions to prevent bribery of foreign public officiais in Latvia, Tunisia, and Malaysia. The penalty was a fme of2.5 million francs and confiscation of36.4 million francs, representing the counter-value of illicit profits estimated on the basis ofthe operating profit margin. In fact, these profits were not earned by Alstom Network Switzerland AG but by other operative subsidiaries of the group. Obviously, this was part of the bargain involving the whole gronp who most likely tried to keep the other subsidiaries out of the criminal proceedings and to have the charges against the mother company dropped.
This strate gy seems to have paid off, as the Office of the Attorney General issued a second order on the same day, dismissing ali charges against the mother company. A remarkable aspect of this order is thal it holds the French mother company to be within the territorial reach of Swiss criminal law, as its employees had committed crimes on Swiss soi! by cooperating with Alstom Network Switzerland AG. Due to the criminalliability of the mother company being engaged because of the acts attributed to ils own employees, the Office of the Attorney General did not need to enter into the controversy of group liability.
In spite of the fact thal jurisdiction over the French mother company could be established, the charges were dismissed because the company had made efforts to prevent cmruption, although they were not sufficient, and because it had cooperated in the inquiry and made reparations in the form of a payment of l million francs to the International Committee of the Red Cross for projects in Latvia, Tunisia, and Malaysia. The Office of the Attorney General therefore held !hat the public and private interests at stake did not warrant further prosecution (Article 53 SCC). This argument is questionable, and there is no way ofknowing if this or any other part of the deal would have stood if challenged before a court of law.
Alstom's Compliance Policy Under the Scrutiny of the Office of the Attorney General
During the investigations "the [Office of the Attorney General] established !hat the group bad implemented a Compliance po licy thal was suit able in principle, but thal it had not enforced it with the necessary persistence and therefore acts of bribery in Latvia, Tunisia and Malaysia were not prevented." 20 The overall design of Alstom's compliance program was in principle, considered satisfactory. The fact thal the group compliance function bad been consolidated in one company ofthe conglomerate was considered acceptable. The company upheld a po licy prohibiting corruption directed towards its employees and the consultants. The consultants retained by Alstom were under the obligation to detail the contractual services they performed in connection with contracts awarded to Alstom and substantiate them with required proofs of rendered services. There was a po licy in force governing the selection of consultants: Only persons effectively residing or having offices and bank accounts in the country in which the project was carried out could be used as consultants. The consultants' services were preferably to be perfmmed via an established company with ali normal office facilities and records. There was a ban on signing consultancy agreements with offshore companies or shell companies.
However, although the policies defined were suitable, the Office of the Attorney General held that there were severe shortcomings in their implementation. Sorne consultaucy agreements were signed in breach of the po licy against offshore aud shell companies and with consultants who were not well established aud had no bank account in the target countries. No suitable organizational measures were imposed against consultants or employees, who bad not respected the internai guidelines, to make sure that tainted deals would not continue. The compliance division was severely understaffed (less than 20 individuals for a workforce of about 75,000); the employees working there had no relevant professional experience in the compliance sector at the time they were hired aud were not properly trained. Furthermore, the compliance division was given an insufficiently prominent role within Alstom's organizational structure to enforce compliance regulations.
Conclusion
The fact that only very few convictions imposing sanctions on the basis of Article 102 sec have been hauded down so far does not mean that this basis for criminal liability ofundertakings has had no effect at ali since it was introduced in 2003. The direct Iiability regime (Article 102 (2) SCC) encourages companies to develop polides and take measures against active bribery in order to avoid incurring criminal sanctions. Although this preventive effect of corporate criminalliability cannot be viewed, strict! y speaking, as a partnership between the public and the private sector, the mechanism put in place institutes an obligation to identify aud mauage criminal risks which differ from one business to another aud therefore are best addressed by the companies themselves.
lt would be naïve, however, to think that the efficacy of preventive efforts made by the private sector is the sole explanation for the fact that criminal convictions of companies on corruption or any other charges have been so scarce so far. The fact that corporate criminal liability cau only be established if the prosecution proves that there were organizational shortcomings, and that without them the offense could not have been committed, remains a difficult hurdle to overcome.
Forms of negotiated justice are therefore a necessary tool for the efficient handling of corporate crime. Swiss criminal procedure has been traditionally reluctaut towards plea bargains, but the SCCP of 2007 introduced sorne instruments encouraging negotiation between the prosecution and the defense, in particular, a simplified procedure amounting to a plea bargain ("procédure simplifiée," "abgekürztes Verfahren," "procedura abbreviata"; Article 358 seq. SCCP).
Detecting corporate crime in general and corruption in particular remains a significant challenge. An importaut role is played by the finaucial intermediaries and their suspicious activities reports providing the criminal justice system with information about customers and transactions to which they have access (Article 9 Money Laundering Act). This source of fmancial intelligence is protected by a robust legal framework.
The contrazy must be said about measures encouraging whistle-blowing. While whistle-blowers are viewed as heroes in sorne countries, the Swiss still show a cultural intolerance towards what is often perceived as a form of betrayal. Swiss labor law allows employers to terminale contractual relations without giving any reason, and even if the termination is considered to be an abuse of law, the remedy is only fmancial compensation without the right to reintegration into the working place. Government bills designed to improve the protection of whistle-blowers in the private sector have met with harsh criticism from industry. This attitude is shortsighted, as credible compliance prograrns must implement mechanisms which ensure the detection of corporate crime from within.
